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The Creation of Industry Front Groups: The Tobacco 
Industry and “Get Government Off Our Back”
| DorieE. Apollonio, PhD, and Lisa A. Bero, PhDWe investigated how in-
dustries use front groups to
combat public health mea-
sures by analyzing tobacco
industry documents, con-
temporaneous media re-
ports, journal articles, and
press releases regarding
“Get Government Off Our
Back,” a coalition created by
the tobacco industry.
RJ Reynolds created Get
Government Off Our Back in
1994 to fight federal regula-
tion of tobacco. By keeping
its involvement secret, RJ
Reynolds was able to draw
public and legislative sup-
port and to avoid the tobacco
industry reputation for mis-
representing evidence.
The tobacco industry is
not unique in its creation of
such groups. Research on
organizational background
and funding could identify
other industry front groups.
Those who seek to establish
measures to protect public
health should be prepared
to counter the argument
that government should not
regulate private behavior.
(Am J Public Health. 2007;97:
419–427. doi:10.2105/AJPH.
2005.081117)
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY HAS
a history of misrepresenting sci-
entific evidence,1–4 attempting to
directly influence government
through the use of lobbying and
campaign contributions,5–8 and is
responsible for more than
440000 deaths annually in the
United States.9 Over time, these
factors have compromised the to-
bacco industry’s reputation with
the general public and made po-
litical association with its inter-
ests a liability.10–14
The creation of a seemingly
independent organization advan-
taged the tobacco industry by
presenting its antiregulation
agenda as an expression of popu-
lar will, and allowed industry
lobbyists access to policymakers
who were otherwise unwilling to
work with them. We describe
the formation and activities of a
tobacco industry front group that
was created to fight proposed to-
bacco regulation by the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration (OSHA) in
1994 and 1995.
The tobacco industry recruits
potential allies from all ideologi-
cal backgrounds. These include
historically disenfranchised
groups such as African Ameri-
cans and gays and lesbians, as
well as other industry associa-
tions, civil rights organizations,
service providers such as home-
less shelters, and strongly ideo-
logical groups, including libertari-
ans.7,15–19 Frequently, these
organizations are financially
compensated in exchange for
advocating on behalf of tobacco
industry political goals.16,20 To-
bacco companies have also cre-
ated “smokers’ rights” front
groups, such as the National
Smokers Alliance, in the hope of
generating political pressure on
behalf of tobacco issues.7,21–23
Researchers and the media have
been justifiably suspicious of
such protobacco advocacy
groups24 and have quickly ex-
posed their tobacco industry fi-
nancial support.
Unlike the goals of other front
groups exposed by tobacco in-
dustry document research, the
goals of the front group created
by RJ Reynolds in 1994, Get
Government Off Our Back (re-
ferred to in RJ Reynolds’s docu-
ments as “GGOOB”),25,26 were
not overtly tobacco-related. Re-
search in economics and political
science has noted that political
decisionmakers discount the ac-
tivities of organizations that are
obviously self-interested,27–32
such as “smokers’ rights” groups.
The prevailing assumption is that
these groups will protest whether
or not their position reflects pop-
ular support, unlike more nonex-
tremist groups.29,31 Many firms
have an incentive to deceive poli-
cymakers, especially about their
sponsorship of lobbying activi-
ties,32,33 and creation of a front
group that appears to be broad-
based makes this possible.29,34
Organizations learn from each
other,35,36 in part because they
sometimes use the same legal or
public relations firms to organize
political activities, and RJ Reyn-
olds’s success with GGOOB is
consistent with the activities of
other industries. Although there
is limited research on the use of
non–tobacco industry front
groups, evidence suggests that
pharmaceutical manufacturers,
telecommunications firms, and
credit unions have engaged in
similar efforts.37,38 The history
of GGOOB provides insight for
researchers and policymakers
that may help forestall future
misrepresentation by industry
interest groups and limit the use
of front groups through the iden-
tification of their creators.
METHODS
In conjunction with legal set-
tlements between 46 state attor-
neys general and the major to-
bacco companies in the United
States, more than 40 million
pages of internal tobacco indus-
try documents have been made
publicly available. These docu-
ments are Web-accessible at the
Legacy Tobacco Documents Li-
brary (http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu) and Tobacco Documents
Online (http://tobaccodocuments.
org), as well as from major US
tobacco companies. Documents
used for this paper were re-
trieved between September
2003 and December 2004, pri-
marily from the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library and Tobacco
Documents Online.
Internal corporate documents
such as those provided by the
1998 Master Settlement Agree-
ment39,40 make it possible to de-
termine which “public interest”
groups are front groups and
which represent genuine public
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TABLE 1—Timeline of Events From Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)
Proposed Regulation to “Get Government Off Our Back” (GGOOB)
Mobilization to Legislative Activity: 1994–2001
Date Event
February 1994 The FDA announces its intention to regulate tobacco as a drug; It 
begins an investigation into whether cigarette manufacturers 
designed their products to take advantage of the 
pharmacological effects of nicotine.
April 1994 OSHA announces a proposed rule that would regulate indoor air 
quality in workplaces that allow smoking.
June 1994 RJ Reynolds runs “I’d like to get government off my back”
advertisement in national print media.
September 1994 OSHA begins hearings on its proposed rule, which eventually draw 
more than 115 000 comments, most of which were solicited 
by the tobacco industry.
October 1994 Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin proposes the creation of an ad hoc 
GGOOB coalition.
First identified press release for GGOOB (in North Carolina); 
introduces “GGOOB resolution.”
Beginning of 1995 Roster of organizations that sponsor GGOOB modified to suggest a 
national focus; tobacco organizations no longer listed.
February 1995 US House of Representatives passes a moratorium on new federal 
regulation as part of the Republican Contract With America.
March 1995 GGOOB designates March as “Regulatory Revolt Month” and 
organizes rallies in 12 states.
US Senate debates moratorium on new federal regulation 
(comparable to US House bill).
OSHA hearings closed.
April 1995 Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin writes follow-up memo regarding 
GGOOB to RJ Reynolds and proposes additional mobilization.
August 1995 Draft FDA rule announced; proposes restrictions on advertising to 
minors.
OSHA follow-up hearings closed.
January 1996 OSHA comment period closed.
December 2001 OSHA withdraws proposed rule.
sentiment. We used these docu-
ments to determine RJ Reynolds’s
motivation for creating GGOOB
and its goals for the organiza-
tion’s activities. Using previously
established techniques for sys-
tematically searching tobacco
document archives,41 we began
our online search with initial
search terms such as organiza-
tional and individual names and
references to the FDA and
OSHA regulations proposed. 
Searches were expanded with
a “snowball” strategy, wherein
contextual information from ini-
tial searches to identify additional
search terms and relevant docu-
ments, including names of indi-
viduals and organizations, date
ranges, places, and reference
(Bates) numbers. More than
3000 internal tobacco industry
documents that pertained to FDA
and OSHA regulation, GGOOB,
and the organizations that
claimed to sponsor it (other than
RJ Reynolds) were identified and
screened for relevance. We also
reviewed secondary data sources
for corroborating information
about funding and organizational
activities including newspaper
and journal articles, accessed
using Lexis-Nexis, JSTOR, and
Internet searches using Google.
We drew from approximately
200 documents, dated from
1993 to 1997, to prepare this
article. Many of the initial docu-
ments we found were copies of
contemporaneous public infor-
mation such as press releases
and advertising for the organiza-
tion; these were frequently du-
plicative or irrelevant to our
analysis. Our interpretative data
analysis was iterative and in-
volved review of the documents
to identify recurring themes and
organizational strategies and to
establish a timeline until the pro-
cess yielded no new information.
We relied on expectations about
organizational lobbying behavior




The inspiration for GGOOB
appears to have been drawn
from a print advertisement run
by RJ Reynolds shortly after the
OSHA and FDA announcements
that proposed new regulations on
tobacco (Table 1). The ad ap-
peared in June 1994 in newspa-
pers around the United States
and showed a man standing in
front of a pickup truck and look-
ing out at the reader (Figure 1).
The text read, “I’m one of Amer-
ica’s 45 million smokers. I’m not
a moaner or a whiner. But I’m
getting fed up. I’d like to get the
government off my back.”42,43
The advertisement claimed that
smoking restrictions were a
smokescreen by a government
determined to control individual
behavior by banning cigarettes,
followed by “liquor and fast food
and buttermilk.”42,43 Ultimately,
this advertisement and those in
the same series drew attention
both from other tobacco compa-
nies44–46 and from a number of
individuals who wrote to the
company.47–51
In October 1994, the public
relations firm Mongoven, Biscoe
and Duchin proposed the cre-
ation of an ad hoc coalition to
“Get Government Off Our
Back.”25 The firm has developed
initiatives for RJ Reynolds that
advocate protobacco goals
through outside organizations26;
among other projects, the firm
organized veterans organizations
to oppose the workplace smok-
ing regulation proposed by
OSHA.25,26 GGOOB was in-
tended to have popular support
as well as backing from outside
organizations.25,26 As a result, it
relied on existing groups re-
cruited by RJ Reynolds52 as well
as on voluntary efforts from the
general population. Thus,
GGOOB was created to combat
increasing numbers of proposed
federal and state regulations on
the use and sale of tobacco
products.
Although the creation and
development of GGOOB was
funded by RJ Reynolds through
Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin,
the company itself was not iden-
tified as a sponsor in the public
communications or press cover-
age that we found.53–55 The first
identified press release for the
organization appeared in Octo-
ber 1994 and noted that a num-
ber of North Carolina groups had
decided to join the GGOOB
coalition (Table 2). These in-
cluded obvious tobacco industry
affiliates such as the Tobacco
Growers Information Committee
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Source. RJ Reynolds.42
FIGURE 1—RJ Reynolds’s “Get the Government Off My Back” Advertisement, June 1994.
and Tobacco Growers Associa-
tion of North Carolina. The press
release claimed that these organi-
zations had all joined the coali-
tion as part of a “grass roots
movement responding to the be-
lief of many Americans that our
government, at all levels, is grow-
ing out of control.”56 In addition,
it introduced the GGOOB resolu-
tion, which demanded that
elected officials “reduce the size
of government and the number
of needless regulations at all
levels of government.”56
Although the initial coalition
was made up largely of tobacco
growers and distributors,56 by
1995 the roster of supporting
organizations was changed. The
new “sponsors” appeared to con-
sist only of ideologically moti-
vated groups who sought to limit
government regulation,57 and the
roster no longer mentioned
organizations that had obvious
tobacco connections. The list in-
cluded groups such as the US
Chamber of Commerce and Citi-
zens for a Sound Economy, as
well as a range of property rights
groups.57 There is limited infor-
mation on tobacco industry con-
tributions to these organizations,
but at least 18 of the 39 organi-
zations listed (46%) received fi-
nancial support from the tobacco
industry, and 3 more organiza-
tions (8%) were spun off from
tobacco-funded groups.20,58–111
Citizens for a Sound Economy,
for example, received millions of
dollars in contributions from the
tobacco industry in the 1990s,
including an estimated $400,000
in 1994 alone,59 which it used
to fight FDA regulation indepen-
dently as well as in concert with
GGOOB.52,112 Some groups were
supported indirectly; US Term
Limits was an organization cre-
ated by Citizens for a Sound
Economy in 1991 under the
American Journal of Public Health | March 2007, Vol 97, No. 3422 | Protecting the Public From Environmental Hazards | Peer Reviewed | Apollonio and Bero
 PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
TABLE 2—Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) Listed
Members, 1994 and 1995
199458 GGOOB 199559 GGOOB 
Listed Members (North Carolina) Listed Members (National)
Bright Belt Warehouse Associationa Alliance for America
Jerry Williams, NC Restaurant Association American Legislative Exchange Councilb
John Locke Foundationb American Rental Association
NC Convenience Store Association Americans for Tax Reformb
NC Grange Mutual Insurance Company Association of Concerned Taxpayers
NC State Grangea Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise
NC Taxpayers Unitedb Christian Voters League
NC Wholesalers Associationa Citizens for a Sound Economyb
Southern Association of Wholesale Distributorsa Competitive Enterprise Instituteb
Tobacco Growers Association of NCa Concerned Women for America Legislative 
Tobacco Growers Information Committeea Action Committee
Consumer Alertb
Council for Citizens Against Government Wasteb
Council for Government Reform
Defenders of Property Rightsb
Environmental Policy Task Forcec
Heartland Instituteb
Home School Legal Defense Association
Institute for Justiceb
International Foodservice Distributors 
Association
Law Enforcement Alliance of Americac
National American Wholesale Grocers’
Association
National Association of Convenience Storesb
National Association of Wholesale 
Distributors
National Center for Public Policy Researchb
National Grangea
National Rifle Associationb




Small Business of America
Small Business Survival Committeeb
Square One
Stewards of Family Farms, Ranches, and Forests
Traditional Values Coalition
US Business and Industrial Council
US Chamber of Commerceb
US Term Limitsc
Western Forest Industries Association
aOrganization in which the tobacco industry was a member.
bOrganization funded by the tobacco industry.20,58–111
cOrganization spun off from a group funded by the tobacco industry.20,58–111
name Citizens for Congressional
Reform.20 These groups also
received support from other
industries.20,60–66
Throughout the creation and
development of GGOOB, the de-
cision of RJ Reynolds and Mon-
goven, Biscoe and Duchin to
create the lobbying coalition was
never mentioned by the coali-
tion, and we were unable to find
any mention of this in the popu-
lar press. Instead, organizers
claimed the group was created to
protect small business, because
larger firms “often welcome new
regulations because they know
the regulations will help consoli-
date their market share and
wipe out small business competi-
tors.”113 The GGOOB literature
and Web site posed the question,
“How did Get Government Off
Our Back get started?” The an-
swer provided was, “Because of
the growing number of cases of
government waste and abuse na-
tionwide, civic groups and other
organizations have already been
forming all over the country to
respond to the problem. So the
strength of this movement is, and
will remain, at the grass-roots
level. It’s only because the prob-
lem is becoming so prevalent
that it is pushing its way into the
national spotlight.”114
GGOOB claimed that govern-
ment should leave individuals
and businesses to make their
own accommodation, a position
that drew extensive public sup-
port. Its apparent focus on a
broad ideological issue deflected
attention from its underlying to-
bacco industry agenda.
Organizational Activities
By 1995, GGOOB had gener-
ated enough media attention that
it began to organize events de-
signed to draw popular support.
The organization designated
March 1995 as “Regulatory Re-
volt Month” and organized anti-
regulation rallies in 12 states.115
With the development of these
rallies and other recruitment ef-
forts, lobbyists for RJ Reynolds
were able to contact state legisla-
tors without their necessarily re-
alizing that they were speaking
to tobacco industry representa-
tives. In Florida, Senator Mario
Diaz-Balart was recruited by
RJ Reynolds to speak to the state
GGOOB rally, but there was “no
mention of tobacco” in the dis-
cussion.116 Letters were sent to
legislators in other states request-
ing that they attend the GGOOB
rallies and support the goal of re-
duced regulation, again without
mentioning tobacco issues.117,118
Contemporaneous media reports
claimed that in response to these
solicitations and rallies, several
state legislators signed the
GGOOB resolution that sug-
gested a moratorium on all new
government regulation.119–122
The GGOOB resolution dove-
tailed with the goals of the newly
Republican-led US House of
Representatives and its Contract
With America, and in 1995 the
House passed a bill that froze
new federal regulations, and de-
manded that in the future no
“unnecessary” federal regulations
be allowed. This text matched
the GGOOB resolution nearly
verbatim,123–126 although we
found no evidence that indicated
whether this was deliberate. The
antiregulatory provisions of the
Contract With America were
written by lobbyists from regu-
lated industries.28
In April 1995, Mongoven,
Biscoe and Duchin wrote a
follow-up memo about GGOOB
to RJ Reynolds executives. In it,
they noted that their objective
was “to mobilize national and
state-level resources to oppose
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regulations and legislation that is
in opposition to RJ R[eynolds]’s
interests . . . . Most important at
this time is to expand on and use
more effectively the elements that
are already in place, specifically
GGOOB.”127 They noted plans to
organize, train, and guide “Action
Corps” and “Truth Squads”128
media tours on the state and
local levels through GGOOB, and
to continue to recruit outside or-
ganizations to oppose regulations
through the coalition.127,129–132
Although GGOOB advocated re-
duced regulation of all business,
it chose to focus on regulations
that restricted smoking indoors,133
unsurprising given the organiza-
tional and financial support pro-
vided by RJ Reynolds.
By this time, GGOOB itself
had become well known enough
that some organizations and indi-
viduals sought out membership
in the coalition without being
solicited.134–136 The GGOOB ral-
lies drew substantial press atten-
tion at the national and state
levels.120–122,134,135,137–141 Through-
out late 1994 and 1995, internal
RJ Reynolds documents from the
company’s external relations
group listed developing GGOOB
groups and encouraged them to
communicate “grass roots” anti-
regulatory positions to government
as a continuing priority.142–145
These documents make it clear
that RJ Reynolds viewed GGOOB
as a more politically palatable ex-
tension of company lobbying ef-
forts. The company chose to send
GGOOB allies when possible,
rather than its own lobbyists,
to oppose excise taxes, clean
indoor air, and tobacco control
in general.118,139,146–152
By August 1995, RJ Reynolds
had nearly completely integrated
its use of GGOOB and the organ-
izations claiming to sponsor it in
its political activities. Individuals
affiliated with these organizations
signed op-eds written by RJ
Reynolds under their own names,
forwarded RJ Reynolds position
papers to other groups under
their own names, and advocated
independently against tobacco
regulation.153–155 In addition, to-
bacco industry lobbyists were
sent to locations such as the Perot
Convention to convince attendees
to sign the GGOOB resolution
and to send postcards that op-
posed regulation. In a media in-
terview in Dallas, one tobacco in-
dustry lobbyist “wearing his
GGOOB hat” cited the FDA reg-
ulation of tobacco as “a perfect
example of excessive regulation
and big, expensive government
run amok.”156
As the threat of wide-reaching
FDA and OSHA regulation re-
ceded, RJ Reynolds reduced its
commitment to GGOOB. By the
beginning of 1996, RJ Reynolds’s
external relations documents no
longer referred to the organiza-
tion, aside from mentioning that
an industry ally was running for
the Nevada legislature on the
strength of his past GGOOB affil-
iation.157 It is not clear from the
available documents, however,
whether there was any formal
decision made to disband the
coalition. RJ Reynolds may have
decided that to continue to use
the organization, and to have its
history and funding exposed, was
a political risk. In addition, the
company may have wished to
reduce its financial commitment
to outside advocacy organiza-
tions, given that some of these
groups (such as Citizens for a
Sound Economy) received sub-
stantial contributions. The rela-
tively short time period during
which GGOOB existed meant
that there was little investigation
that might have identified its
character. Although an academic
paper published in 2002 about
the actions of Mongoven, Biscoe
and Duchin noted that GGOOB
was an industry front group,26
we found no other mention of
the tobacco industry connection
to the organization.
GGOOB was clearly a pure in-
dustry front group throughout its
history; RJ Reynolds and a public
relations firm were entirely re-
sponsible for its creation, organi-
zation, activities, and mainte-
nance.25,127,158 And although some
individuals appear to have volun-
teered to join the group, many of
the organizations involved were
financially compensated for
their participation.20,60–66 Overall,
RJ Reynolds’s decision to create
GGOOB appears to have been an
unqualified success. The organiza-
tion drew popular support from
the public and from legislators,
gathered extensive press attention
for tobacco industry political posi-
tions, and assisted in derailing 2
proposed regulations of work-
place smoking and tobacco sales.
Evidence from previous case stud-
ies of public relations efforts that
used coalitions suggests that these
accomplishments were partially or
wholly contingent on the fact that
some participants and the media
did not realize the organization
was an industry front group.28
DISCUSSION
RJ Reynolds’s development of
GGOOB suggests that industries
may successfully block legisla-
tion and regulation with the de-
velopment of allied organiza-
tions that are not obviously
connected to their issues. Dur-
ing the 2-year period that
GGOOB was active, there was
very little discussion of how a
new and previously unknown
organization managed to fund
multiple rallies and events,
widely publicize them (in at
least 1 case with an airplane fly-
ing overhead that trailed the
coalition’s logo),137 and make its
agenda a top priority for a
range of existing national advo-
cacy groups. Asking these ques-
tions might have revealed RJ
Reynolds’s involvement in gen-
erating GGOOB from little more
than a substantial lobbying
budget and an advertisement
that drew popular attention.
Even a review of the organiza-
tion’s early press releases,
which specifically referenced
support from tobacco growers
and distributors, could have
identified the tobacco industry
connection.159 However, neither
the advocacy groups that sup-
ported regulation nor the media
appear to have investigated the
coalition contemporaneously.
The history of GGOOB sug-
gests that policymakers, advo-
cates, and the media should be
cautious in accepting the claims
of groups that purport to reflect
popular disaffection, whether or
not they appear to have an in-
dustry connection. Existing re-
search on public relations notes
that media investigation of orga-
nizational sponsors has fre-
quently limited the effectiveness
of front groups,28,30 and notes
that to require industries to dis-
close all of their political activity
would also limit the value of
front groups to industry.32 To
date, however, there are no rules
requiring such disclosure, and
media attention to the sponsor-
ship of groups that are not obvi-
ously self-interested has been
sporadic. The limited attention to
organizational sponsorship is sur-
prising given that nearly 90% of
advocacy groups, when surveyed,
admit that they are primarily de-
pendent on outside patronage for
their funding.160
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Advocates for public health in
particular should also consider
ideological arguments that have
the potential to draw substantial
public support against new mea-
sures to protect public health.
The claim that government
should leave individuals and
businesses to make their own ac-
commodations drew extensive
public support, and if this argu-
ment is accepted, makes scientific
evidence that supports measures
to protect public health appear
less important.161 In at least some
cases, public and legislative sup-
port for this position appears to
have developed without these
supporters realizing that they
were being solicited by the to-
bacco industry. Research on the
use of ideological arguments in
policymaking suggests that indus-
tries rely on such claims to main-
tain a profitable status quo.4 Pub-
lic health advocates who seek
new regulation or legislation
should be prepared to address
these kinds of ideological claims
directly.162 The success of
GGOOB relied largely on the
appeal of the ideological position
that dealing with tobacco issues
should not be the province of
government but the business of
business.
This research has certain limi-
tations. The history of GGOOB is
a single case study, which gives
the history of 1 organization at a
time when the industry that cre-
ated it faced immense political
threat. The tobacco industry in
particular has an incentive to cre-
ate front groups because it has
historically been viewed as un-
trustworthy.11–14 In addition,
the reliance on internal industry
documents and press reports,
rather than on contemporaneous
interviews with policymakers,
raises questions about the true
influence of the organization in
affecting the outcome of the
FDA and OSHA regulatory bat-
tles. However, the substantial or-
ganizational and financial com-
mitment made by RJ Reynolds
suggests that the coalition did
provide some value to the to-
bacco industry.
The successful development of
industry front groups such as
GGOOB has implications beyond
tobacco regulation. Similar public
health issues arise in debates
about food policy and obesity,
pharmaceutical regulation, limita-
tions on the production of oil and
gas, and attempts to control pol-
lutants. Organizations learn from
each other35,36 and research on
lobbying suggests that other in-
dustries (such as the pharmaceu-
tical industry) that face new re-
strictions have developed similar
kinds of front groups to advocate
on their behalf.37,38 However, un-
like the tobacco industry, few of
these other industries have been
required to release the kinds of
internal documents that would
make the creation of such groups
evident to outside observers.
Lacking this kind of information,
policymakers and advocates
should research newly formed
coalitions, as well as extrapolate
from evidence provided by de-
scriptions of tobacco industry
activity obtained by looking
through the “keyhole” of internal
industry documents.
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